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Abstract
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are used to control and monitor a
nation’s critical infrastructure. Unfortunately the security of these
systems is often lacking. They were not designed with security in
mind and often contain legacy components with known vulnerabil-
ities. System owners are often not aware that these vulnerabilities
are present, or what their impact may be on system operations when
they are exploited. To help the system owners with these issues, the
FAST-CPS framework has been developed.
FAST-CPS offers an automatic security analysis of cyber-physical
systems based on a model of the system: Vulnerabilities are ex-
tracted and their effects on the system processes are returned, a
data flow analysis is performed to identify conflicts between the dif-
ferent stakeholders in the system, and attack trees are automatically
constructed for selected attacker goals in order to help with a qual-
itative risk assessment of the system. This article demonstrates the
workings of the FAST-CPS framework on a real-life case study: an
industrial hatchery.
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Abstract. Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are used to control and mon-
itor a nation’s critical infrastructure. Unfortunately the security of these
systems is often lacking. They were not designed with security in mind
and often contain legacy components with known vulnerabilities. System
owners are often not aware that these vulnerabilities are present, or what
their impact may be on system operations when they are exploited. To
help the system owners with these issues, the FAST-CPS framework has
been developed [19].
FAST-CPS offers an automatic security analysis of cyber-physical sys-
tems based on a model of the system: Vulnerabilities are extracted and
their effects on the system processes are returned, a data flow analysis
is performed to identify conflicts between the different stakeholders in
the system, and attack trees are automatically constructed for selected
attacker goals in order to help with a qualitative risk assessment of the
system. This article demonstrates the workings of the FAST-CPS frame-
work on a real-life case study: an industrial hatchery.
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1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) comprise a broad range of applications, including
industrial control systems (ICS), robotics, supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) systems, and more. A CPS is a network of interacting elements
with physical input and output, it usually contains various remote field sites
where a certain process is taking place. Each field site consists of sensors and
actuators, controlled locally by a programmable logic controller (PLC), remote
terminal unit (RTU), or similar device. These remote sites are connected to a
centralized control network where operators can remotely monitor and control
the processes. The combination of computational and physical aspects is what
defines CPS [14,35].
In the past decades, these systems have evolved from proprietary, isolated
systems to complex interconnected systems that are remotely accessible and
often use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. This has made them
easier to use, but also easier to attack [6]. These systems have different security
requirements from traditional IT systems [4,29]. In IT, the CIA triad is often
referenced: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability [10]. IT systems are often used
to deal with personal data or other privacy sensitive information, hence the con-
fidentiality of this data is paramount. Encryption and cryptography have been
studied a great deal to ensure this requirement [9]. For similar reasons, it should
not be possible to tamper with the data that is sent through these systems. The
integrity of the data must be preserved, and it should be possible to prove that
the data has not been tampered with. This is achieved with hash functions or
MACs [2]. Finally, the availability of the system is a third requirement. In case of
emergencies, back-up centres should be in place to ensure continuous operation.
For CPS the situation is different [26,23]. These systems often take care of
critical infrastructure, e.g. traffic lights, power plants, water treatment facilities,
etc. Hence availability is suddenly much more important. The consequences of
one hour downtime for a traffic light system can be catastrophic. Confidentiality,
on the other hand, is often less important than in IT systems. The data that
flows through these systems is usually just sensor data and actuator commands.
As a result, some communication protocols commonly used in CPS do not pro-
vide encryption. Hence some papers reverse the CIA triad and talk about AIC
in control systems [5]. There are exceptions to this, for instance production en-
vironments where some data is to be kept confidential. Here encryption is seen
as a possible solution, though only if it does not adversely affect the availability
constraints.
The physical nature of the systems also introduces safety as a new factor that
must be considered. When CPS malfunction, people can get hurt, in IT systems
this is rarely the case. Finally, these systems should be highly deterministic and
reliable, even the smallest chance of an error or unexpected behaviour should
not be allowed. Hence in CPS the SRA triad is also used: Safety, Reliability,
Availability [34].
Numerous cyber-physical systems have been attacked in recent years. Exam-
ples of notable incidents include the Maroochy Shire sewage spill in Australia [1],
and the Stuxnet worm in Iran [22,13,7]. More recently, the Ukrainian grid was
compromised which caused hundreds of thousands of people to lose power for
several hours [36,3], and the WannaCry ransomware attack affected control sys-
tems worldwide [25]. In the latter two cases, known vulnerabilities were exploited
by the attackers, highlighting the importance of identifying known vulnerabil-
ities in these systems and evaluating the possible consequences of an attacker
exploiting them.
Various research initiatives have been undertaken in previous years to im-
prove the security of cyber-physical systems, both from the academic world and
industry. One such initiative is the FAST-CPS framework [19]. This framework
aims to provide an automatic security assessment of CPS based on a CPS model.
In this article the functionality of the FAST-CPS framework is briefly explained,
and the framework is then applied to a real-life case study. Step by step, it is
shown which actions the assessor must perform and what kinds of feedback the
platform can provide.
The outline of this article is as follows. Section 2 discusses related work in the
area, including other tools that perform a security assessment of CPS. Section
3 gives an overview of the functionality of the framework. In section 4, the
framework is then used to analyse the security of an industrial hatchery. Section
5 evaluates the framework. Finally, section 6 concludes the article.
2 Related Work
In [28], the authors use UML system models to automatically create dynamic
fault trees (DFTs). These DFTs are then analysed to compute the reliability of a
system. FAST-CPS applies a similar approach. The Systems Modelling Language
(SysML) is used instead of UML. SysML extends UML with several new or mod-
ified diagrams and is more suited for modelling systems or systems-of-systems.
Further, the approach does not aim to draw conclusions regarding reliability, but
focuses on security instead. Currently there is a lack of attention for system se-
curity in model-based system engineering, as discussed in [27]. FAST-CPS aims
to fill this gap.
Other tools for the automated security assessment of cyber-physical systems
are under development, aiming to assist a system operator with identifying
whether their system is secure. Four such tools that are complete or nearing
the stage of completion and that are publicly available are presented here:
2.1 CSET
Homeland Security has created the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET)
[11]. This tool checks compliance of a system with a chosen standard through
a question and answer method. There are 24 standards the assessor can choose
between. Once a standard has been chosen, the tool generates a list of questions
that will assess system compliance with the given standard.
CSET also has a diagram feature where the assessor can model the network
topology of their system. The tool then gives warnings in order to assist the
assessor in finding a more secure network architecture. From this diagram, the
assessor can also generate a list of questions from a standard, but only questions
related to the components in the system. Hence this feature helps in condensing
the list of possible questions.
2.2 ADVISE
ADVISE [20] determines which way an attacker is most likely to go about at-
tacking a system. The tool has been added to the Mo¨bius framework [8] to make
use of its modelling formalisms and solution techniques.
Modelling a CPS in ADVISE is done from the point of view of the attacker.
The system architecture itself is not modelled, only the attacker path. First the
assessor must decide what the attacker goals are. Next, the assessor adds the
attack steps that the attacker must complete before the goals are reached. Each
attack step is then assigned further prerequisites. There are three possible types:
access to networks or workstations, required attacker skills, and knowledge such
as passwords. The result of an attack step can be an attacker goal, or increased
access/knowledge for the attacker.
When the assessor has mapped out all the attack steps, he now has to model
the adversary. This includes specifying the attacker’s initial knowledge/access
and the attacker proficiency in all skills. The assessor also indicates how much
the attacker cares about detection versus pay-off, and the relative importance of
the different goals. The result is an Attack Execution Graph (AEG). The AEG
represents potential attack steps against the system. ADVISE automatically
generates an executable model that represents how the adversary is likely to
attack the system. Once the attack execution graph is modelled, the assessor
can run the framework to determine which attacker goals will be reached with
what probability.
2.3 CyberSAGE
CyberSAGE [33] is similar to ADVISE in terms of output. The assessor will have
to specify a workflow of the threat agent, and the result will show probabilities
of the attacker reaching his goal and his attack steps. However, the tool requires
less security expertise to use as the attack steps are fixed and there are less
attacker variables to decide on.
To generate the resulting argument graph, the assessor needs to provide four
pieces of input. First there is the workflow graph which specifies the actions of
the attacker. There is a list of 19 possible actions the assessor can choose from,
including send command, physical access, inject malicious messages, and so on.
The assessor has the possibility to add additional actions in the rules engine.
Next, the assessor models the system components and networks. This is
largely similar to the diagram feature of CSET, with the exception that com-
ponents can have various properties regarding authentication, access control,
encryption, etc. Less components are available, but the assessor can add his own
components and properties to the palette.
Then, the assessor must model the attacker. The attacker attributes include
his skills, his intention, his access to the system, and his resources. The attacker
model is less detailed than the one used in ADVISE.
The final element of input is the rules engine. A default rules file is supplied
with each CyberSAGE instance. The assessor has the option to edit this and
tweak the probabilities, or add additional attacker actions.
2.4 CySeMoL
CySeMoL [30,31] provides the same kind of feedback as the two previous tools,
e.g. the probability of an attacker reaching some attack goals in a system. How-
ever, in CySeMoL both the attacker and the attacker goals are fixed, the assessor
cannot change them. For their attack probabilities, CySeMoL assumes that the
attacker is a penetration tester who only has access to public tools.
Using CySeMoL does not require security expertise from the assessor. He
just has to model his system according to the Probabilistic Relational Model
(PRM) employed by CySeMoL. The PRM specifies a theory on how attributes
in the model depend on each other.
When modelling the network architecture, the available components on the
palette do not include typical CPS components, but rather a general Operat-
ingSystem block that can be used for all PLCs, HMIs, and so on. These can then
be connected with the relevant ApplicationServer or ApplicationClient compo-
nents. Each component has a fixed number of attributes linked to it, for in-
stance the ApplicationClient component has an attribute HasAllPatches which
the assessor can change to false or true. Modelling a CPS in CySeMoL is not as
straightforward as with the other tools, but there are several tutorials available.
These four tools all aim to help a system operator decide whether their system
is secure, but they go about it in different ways. None of the tools attempt to
find known vulnerabilities in the system, which is the one of the main purposes
of FAST-CPS. Research by Gartner shows that up to 75% of attacks on these
systems is caused by exploiting known vulnerabilities for which a patch or secure
configuration is already available[21].
As a result, the different tools can complement each other. For example,
FAST-CPS can be used to find known vulnerabilities in the system and their
effects on system security, this new information can then lead to a more detailed
attack path in the ADVISE tool in order to get more accurate feedback about
attack probabilities.
What the tools have in common is that they only find weaknesses in the
system, they do not suggest solutions. An exception is the CSET diagram feature
that can give some very basic network topology feedback, i.e. place a firewall here.
Hence the system operator may still need to contact a security audit company
if he does not know how to fix a vulnerability in the system.
3 FAST-CPS
FAST-CPS is an extension of the Papyrus Eclipse modelling environment. Pa-
pyrus allows users to model complex systems using the SysML modelling lan-
guage. FAST-CPS has extended this framework with a knowledge base system.
A parser converts the SysML diagrams into input for the logic engine, where
various types of feedback are automatically extracted. FAST-CPS differs in re-
quired input and returned feedback from the tools presented in the previous
section. ADVISE and CyberSAGE require significant security expertise as the
assessor is expected to model the workflow of the attacker. In FAST-CPS, this
workflow or attacker strategy will be one of the outputs of the system, and no
security expertise is required. Furthermore, the feedback of the framework goes
beyond the probability of a certain attack succeeding: The framework will iden-
tify known vulnerabilities at the hardware/software level and return their effects
on the system processes. In addition, the FAST-CPS framework also provides
some data privacy feedback, showing an assessor what happens with the data
assets in his system and returning any conflicts this causes with the data pref-
erences of stakeholders. A full comparison of FAST-CPS and these four other
tools has been published at [17]. The functionality of the FAST-CPS framework
can be split up in three main parts:
Extracting Process Vulnerabilities. The assessor will model his cyber-physical
system in the Systems Modelling Language (SysML). The framework will then
perform an automatic security analysis of the system. Vulnerability databases
such as the one from ICS-CERT are incorporated in the framework in order to
find known hardware and software vulnerabilities. The effect of these vulnerabil-
ities on the system process is then computed. The assessor can also perform sim-
ulations to reason about hypothetical scenarios. This methodology is explained
in detail at [19].
Performing a Data Flow Analysis. The assessor can also reason about the flow
of data assets in his system. With multiple interacting stakeholders present in
today’s CPS, it is no longer trivial to know what is happening to your data. The
FAST-CPS framework will return an asset profile which presents an overview of
which stakeholders can perform operations on which data assets. If this results
in conflicts with any stakeholder preferences, these will also be returned. An
assessor can specify multiple actors for any given stakeholder role, and the system
will search for configurations of actors that cause the least number of conflicts.
More information about this methodology can be found at [18].
Towards Qualitative Risk Assessment. Finally, the framework will also au-
tomatically construct attack trees based on the provided system model and a
chosen attacker goal. The assessor can model different attackers and evaluate
the trees with respect to a chosen attacker. The system will then return the rel-
ative difficulty for the attacker to reach his goal, and show the optimal attacker
strategy that achieves it. Based on this information, an assessor can identify the
weak parts of his system and strengthen them accordingly. By assigning impact
values to the attacker goals, a qualitative risk assessment can be performed. This
work has been accepted for publication at the 2017 International Conference on
Critical Information Infrastructures Security.
4 Assessment of a Cyber-Physical System using
FAST-CPS
In this section, the full functionality of FAST-CPS will be showcased on a case
study: an industrial hatchery. The aim is to give a detailed overview of all the
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Fig. 1. An overview of the steps required to use FAST-CPS.
necessary steps so system owners can start using the framework. The steps re-
quired to use the framework are shown in Figure 1.
4.1 An Industrial Hatchery
The Cyber-physical system considered in this case study is displayed in Figure
2. It consists of a process network, a de-militarized zone (DMZ), and a company
network. The process network is an industrial hatchery. The DMZ contains a
data historian where process data from the hatchery is sent. Employees in the
company network can then access the DMZ to retrieve this data. No direct com-
munication between the company network and process network is possible. The
company network is connected to the internet. Customers can contact the com-
pany to place orders. A cloud-based scheduler is used to process these orders
and create a schedule that makes optimal use of the available incubators in the
hatchery. The schedule is pushed to a PC in the DMZ and operators from the
hatchery can access it there. Finally, the equipment in the hatchery is provided
by an equipment vendor that offers a predictive maintenance (PdM) service.
LoRa sensors measure various incubator metrics and send these over a telecom-
munications cloud to the PdM cloud used by the equipment vendor. The vendor
is also able to send firmware updates for the PLCs and touch screens to the
SCADA PC.
The process network is a hatchery that consists of two types of incubators:
setters and hatchers. Each incubator consists of various sensors and actuators
that are connected to a PLC. At the front of the incubator a touch screen is
used for monitoring the environment variables and controlling the actuators.
Fig. 2. An overview of the use case architecture.
The manager’s office contains a central switch which is connected to all the
PLCs. Here we also find an eWON router that is used by the equipment vendor
to connect to the hatchery remotely, as well as a SCADA PC that logs all the
data and can be used to control all incubators. The process network utilises
role based access control. There are currently three different types of users in
the hatchery. The least privileged users are the technicians, they are not able
to change any process parameters. Next are the operators, they can change all
parameters of the incubators, including the temperature settings, humidity, CO2
levels, etc. The local managers make up the final level. They have access to the
SCADA PC and can apply updates to the machines. Other users considered
in the case study are an Employee in the company network, a Vendor in the
equipment vendor network, and an Attacker.
4.2 Extracting Process Vulnerabilities
A first feature of the FAST-CPS framework is the automatic extraction of pro-
cess vulnerabilities. This functionality is limited to the process network and the
DMZ as the vulnerability databases that are incorporated into FAST-CPS are
specific to CPS components.
STEP 1: Modelling the system. The first step for the assessor is to
model the process network and the DMZ of his system. This can be done in
the framework using the SysML diagram language. Full SysML functionality is
provided by switching to the Papyrus perspective. Detailed instructions on how
to model a CPS correctly for security evaluation with the framework are given
at [15]. The model is created manually by the assessor, hence the availability
constraints of the CPS are not threatened. Below some of the important diagrams
will be highlighted, referenced figures can be found in Appendix A.
Internal Block Diagrams. The assessor will start by modelling all the hardware
components and the connections between them. For each hardware component,
the assessor models the product and version information. This is necessary to
allow feedback from vulnerability databases to be taken into account. Next, the
software modules in each component are modelled, an internal block diagram
is used for this purpose. An example of a diagram representing a setter touch
screen is given in Figure 5. The touch screens used are from the Schneider Pro-
Face GP-4401 series, this information is added in the form of a comment. The
touch screen contains two software modules: an authentication module and a
control module that can change the state of 2 process parameters: a process
actuator and an upper bound in the process invariant. The control module can
only be reached after authenticating to the authentication module. Additional
authentication and authorization information is modelled in separate diagrams.
Parametric Diagrams. Parametric diagrams are used to model the system pro-
cesses. A system process is modelled as an invariant that expresses relations
between environment variables, thresholds and the status of actuators. For in-
stance, one of the processes in our industrial hatchery specifies that the temper-
ature inside a setter incubator should not exceed an upper bound of 37.5◦C. If it
does, the cooling valve actuator in the setter should be opened. This process is
modelled in the parametric diagram shown in Figure 6. All relevant parameters
are included in the centre process block. S1T represents the temperature of setter
1, S1V represents the status of the cooling valve and S1UB represents the upper
bound. The invariant is provided as the constraint of the process block. Depen-
dency arrows between parameters indicate that changing a parameter might also
change the state of another, i.e. in this example changes in both the temperature
and the upper bound could affect the status of the valve. Similar diagrams are
created for the other processes in the process network.
Block Definition Diagrams. A final highlighted modelling concept is the policy
specification, for which a block definition diagram is used. The policy specifica-
tion indicates which user groups are allowed to perform certain operations on the
process parameters. Part of the security evaluation will be to determine whether
this policy is violated or not. Figure 7 shows part of the diagram. Four SysML
Actor components represent the user groups in the system: the technician, the
operator, the manager, and an attacker. Two parameters have been modelled
as blocks, and the possible operations have been added: Read() and Modify().
Now usage arrows are drawn between the users and the operations, indicating
that a user is allowed to perform said operation on the parameter. The attacker
and the technician are not allowed to perform any operations, the operators and
managers can read/modify the status of the setter valve and read the setter
temperature.
STEP 2: Extracting the Vulnerabilities.
Once the system is modelled, the security analysis can be performed. To do
this, the assessor must switch to the Java perspective in the framework and right-
click the .di file of his system model. A FAST-CPS menu will be available from
where the security analysis can be launched. When chosen, the .uml file of the
system model will be parsed into input for our logic programming framework,
IDP3, which will perform the evaluation. The details of how this evaluation
is performed are not in the scope of this article, however they can be found
at [19]. The result of the security evaluation is three new windows that open
in the framework editor. The first window contains the input given to IDP, i.e.
the result of parsing the SysML model into an IDP-readable file. The second is
the output of the IDP analysis, containing the actual results. This file is hard
to read as it is just a collection of tuples, hence the third window shows a
formatted version of the output that focusses on the information extracted from
the important predicates and functions.
The formatted file starts by listing any component or module vulnerabilities
found in the system model. These are found by incorporating CPS vulnerability
databases in our logic framework. An explanation of how these vulnerabilities
are extracted from the model can be found at [19]. Next, the file lists any com-
promised system tasks. There are three types of tasks: Storage tasks concern
storage of process parameters in components. Control tasks connect software
modules with the actuators they can control. Communication tasks concern the
forwarding of parameters to their destination. The logic theory infers which tasks
are compromised as a result of the found vulnerabilities. Finally, at the bottom
of the file any failed access policy verification queries are listed, and an example
for why they fail is included. The different access policy verification queries are:
- Only authorized user groups are able to modify parameters
- Only authorized user groups are able to read parameters
- Only authorized user groups have access to protected networks
- Users only possess the credentials they are authorized to possess
- Only authorized user groups have physical access to components marked as
critical
The full logic theory can be found at [15].
In the case study, two types of component and module vulnerabilities are
reported: The SCADA PC operating system module contains a vulnerability that
can lead to a Remote Code Execution and the setter PLCs contain data leakage
and denial of service vulnerabilities. In the IDP Output file this is reported as
follows:
- HasVulnerability(SCADAPCOSModule,RemoteCodeExecution)
- HasVulnerability(Setter1PLC,DataLeakage)
- HasVulnerability(Setter1PLC,DoS)
Upon inspection, the remote code execution is caused by the SMB proto-
col inside the Windows OS on the SCADA PC. This is the vulnerability that
allowed the WannaCry ransomware to spread [24]. The setter PLCs are Control-
Logix PLCs from Rockwell Automation which have not yet been patched to the
latest firmware version, which leads to DoS and data leakage vulnerabilities [12].
Figure 8 shows the formatted output returned by the security analysis. The
results of the component and module vulnerabilities are visible among the com-
promised tasks. The setter PLC does not perform its storage tasks correctly and
it may not be possible to retrieve the temperature parameter from the sensor,
which is a compromised communication task. Likewise, the SCADA PC control
module may be unable to perform its control tasks as it is vulnerable to a remote
code execution. There are no simulations and no failed queries in this system
model. The runtime of this security analysis is 8.08 seconds on average, timed
across 500 runs.
STEP 3: Performing Simulations.
A final step is to look for solutions and reason about other possible incidents
through the use of simulations. There were two component and module vul-
nerabilities in the system, one concerning the setter PLCs and one concerning
the SCADA PC operating system. No firmware update is available to fix the
PLC issues, hence the assessor must find a new equipment vendor to replace
his hardware. To choose between several possible stakeholders, the data flow
analysis described in Section 4.3 can be used. The assessor can already simulate
new types of PLCs to check if they introduce other vulnerabilities. For instance,
when modelling the Saia PCD1.M2120 PLC, no more PLC vulnerabilities are
reported, hence this is an option. For the OS, it suffices to apply the necessary
patches. Updating the version number accordingly in the internal block diagram
of the SCADA PC results in no more vulnerabilities.
Additional simulations can be run to investigate what happens in specific
vulnerability scenarios. Components and modules can be assigned one of the
five vulnerability categories to simulate what would happen if they contained a
known vulnerability of that type. For instance the assessor might wonder what
happens when the control software module inside the touch screens contains
a vulnerability of type Denial of Service. To simulate this, it suffices to add a
SysML property called ”DoS” of type Vulnerability inside the touch screen block
and connect it to the appropriate module, as shown in Figure 9. Now when the
security analysis is ran again, the formatted output shows that a simulation was
performed, as shown in Figure 10. The result of the denial of service is that the
control module of the touch screen can no longer control its parameters. Further,
this means the operator no longer has a means to modify parameters S1V and
S1UB , which violates a query. The violated queries are shown at the bottom
together with a set of parameters that causes them to fail. More information
about the modelling and evaluation of simulations can be found at [19].
4.3 Performing a Data Flow Analysis
A second feature of the FAST-CPS framework is the data flow analysis of the
system. This functionality applies to the entire system architecture. The analysis
will return which assets can be stored or processed by the actors in the system,
as well as any conflicts this may cause with the asset preferences of actors.
STEP 1: Choosing Actors.
Each cyber-physical system contains multiple stakeholders, for instance the
equipment vendor, the customer, the company, etc. These stakeholder roles can
be filled by different actors, i.e. the equipment vendor could be Siemens, Rockwell
Automation, or another company. Each of these actors may have different data
asset preferences and policies. Some may not want it possible to link a specific
data asset to their identity by another stakeholder. Others may not want their
data stored inside a cloud. The first task for the system owner is to choose the
actors he wants to consider for each stakeholder role. Once those have been
chosen, their asset preferences and policies must be collected. The FAST-CPS
framework does not offer support for this step. These preferences and policies
will be modeled as logic predicates and added to the framework as shown in
STEP 2 below.
For the hatchery case study, the following stakeholders are considered: the
customer who places orders, the company who runs the business side of the
hatchery, the process owner who is in charge of the machines, the equipment
vendor who provides equipment, and then two cloud stakeholders: one that takes
care of the scheduling and one for the predictive maintenance.
For each stakeholder, multiple actors can be considered. The assessor is look-
ing for a new equipment vendor due to the vulnerabilities encountered in the
previous section. Three actors, VendA, VendB and VendC are under consider-
ation. Further, the assessor can choose between SAP HANA and Azure for the
scheduling cloud actor, and between SAP HANA and AWS EC2 for the PdM
cloud actor. Finally, the assessor has modelled two different customer actors rep-
resenting different kinds of data asset preferences the customers tend to have,
CustA and CustB.
Table 1 shows some actor operation preferences related to the data assets that
are applicable to the hatchery case study. Operation preferences specify which
stakeholders should be able to perform operations on data assets. Operations
currently supported are Store (S) and Process (P). Customer A is worried about
the privacy of his assets and only wants to reveal these assets when it is strictly
necessary. When he places an order, only the company stakeholder should be
able to store/process this information, the operators in the process network
do not need to see this. Likewise, their personal information should not travel
further than the company network. Customer B is less worried about his privacy
and does not mind if the process operators have access to this data. Equipment
vendor A does not want the process network to have access to the PdM sensor
data, otherwise the operators could take matters in their own hands. Vend A
also does not want the hatchery to have access to the code of their patches.
Table 1. Actor operation preferences.
Actor Asset Process Comp Vend SCloud PCloud
Cust A Order SP P
CustomerName SP
Cust B Order SP SP P
CustomerName SP SP P
Vend A SensorData SP P
PatchCode SP
Vend B SensorData SP SP P
PatchCode SP SP
OperatorLogs SP SP
Vend C SensorData SP SP P
PatchCode SP SP
Hatchery SensorData SP SP P
PatchCode SP SP
OperatorLogs SP
Equipment vendor B trusts the process network with both the sensor data and
the patch code, in return they would like to have access to the operator logs to
make the PdM process easier. Vendor C trusts the hatchery with sensor data
and patch code and does not require additional logs. The hatchery actor wants
access to both the sensor data and the patch code and has indicated this in the
preferences. In addition, they do not want to release the operator logs to the
equipment vendor for privacy reasons.
It is also possible to reason about linkability and identifiability preferences.
For instance a customer could indicate that it is ok for a stakeholder to have
access to both his Order and CustomerName, as long as the stakeholder is not
able to link these to each other. For identifiability preferences, each actor can
mark a set of assets as identifiable, indicating that this set of assets uniquely
identifies them. They can then indicate that they do not want other stakeholders
to be able to link assets to their identity. More information about how these
preferences are modelled can be found at [18].
For the cloud actors, the assessor must also acquire their data policies and
which directives they abide to. For instance, SAP HANA abides to the EU DPD
whereas Azure complies with the Patriot act.
Finally, the assessor wants to consider two different flows of performing the
predictive maintenance process. One where LoRa sensors are used and the sensor
data is transported straight to the equipment vendor via a TelCo stakeholder,
and one where the process owner is in charge of collecting and sending this data.
All combinations of actors will be mapped on both flows to see which scenario
creates the least conflicts.
STEP 2: Expanding the System Model.
When the necessary information is collected, the assessor must update the
IDP input file with it. The input.idp file is a result of the security analysis
performed in the previous section. It already contains information regarding
the components, channels and processes that are present in the system. Now the
assessor must manually expand the file to include stakeholders, actors and assets
as follows:
type Stakeholder = {Customer ; EquipmentVendor ; Company ; . . .}
type Actor = {CustA; CustB ; VendA; . . .}
type Asset = {Order ; CustomerName; MachineID ; MachineProblem; . . .}
Next, the operator preferences are added as tuples to a predicate:
OperationPref(Actor,Asset,Stakeholder,AssetOperation) = {
(CustA,Order ,Company ,S ); (CustA,Order ,SCloud ,P);
(CustA,CustomerName,Company ,S ); . . .}
The data policies and directives are added in similar fashion:
Directive(Actor,Directive) = {
(SAPHANA,EUDPD); (Azure,Patriot); (AWSEC2 ,Patriot)}
Finally, the asset flow must be modelled, showing which assets flow between
which components in the system, and where they are processed. This is done by
indicating the sender component, receiver component, and the particular assets
that are sent:
AssetFlow(Component,Asset,Component) = {
(CustPC ,Order ,CustRouter);
(CustRouter ,Order ,CompanyRouter);
(CustPC ,CustomerName,CustRouter); . . .}
To show the feasibility of the approach, two different flows are modelled,
resulting in two different IDP input files. In the first flow, a LoRa sensor is used
for predictive maintenance, which means the SensorData asset is sent directly
to the equipment vendor stakeholder over a TelCo network. In the second flow,
this sensor data first passes through the SCADA PC in the process network, and
is then forwarded by the operators to the equipment vendor.
Adding tuples to the IDP file like this is tiresome and error-prone. A GUI
will be provided to enhance the user experience when performing the data flow
analysis. However, it will still be the assessor’s responsibility to provide a com-
plete model, the logic framework cannot check for completeness.
STEP 3: Performing the Data Flow Analysis.
Once the IDP input model has been extended, IDP can be run again to
perform the data flow analysis of the CPS. The output is two-fold: IDP will fill
an AssetProfile predicate which will show the operations that stakeholders can
perform on assets. This way the assessor can get a full overview of what happens
to the data assets in the system. The analysis will then return all conflicts that
exist between this profile and the preferences provided by the actors. The engine
will automatically try all possible combinations of actors and return only the
models that provide the least amount of conflicts. Currently no suggestions on
how to fix these conflicts are generated by the methodology. In this article the
analysis is performed to show the feasibility of the methodology, for details on
how the conflicts are found and a look of what the logic engine looks like, the
reader is referred to [18].
Fig. 3. The number of conflicts returned for each configuration.
In our case study, there are 24 possible configurations of actors for each flow.
Figure 3 shows the number of conflicts returned for each configuration for both
flows. It can immediately be observed that the second flow should be chosen.
For the first flow which uses the LoRa sensor, two models are returned that each
have 2 conflicts with the preferences. In both cases, these conflicts are caused by
the fact that the Hatchery actor does not gain access to the sensor data. The flow
without LoRa contains two models with 0 conflicts. The actors selected in these
two instances are (CustA, VendC, SAPHANA, SAPHANA) and (CustB, VendC,
SAPHANA, SAPHANA). Hence the assessor can conclude that he should use
VendC as the new equipment vendor and SAPHANA for the cloud operations.
The runtime of the data flow analysis is 9.06 seconds on average, timed across
500 runs.
STEP 4: Generating Additional Feedback.
When there are no cases with 0 conflicts, the assessor still has to make de-
cisions about which actors to select. FAST-CPS contains an additional Java
program to further analyse the IDP results. When given an IDP file and a spe-
cific actor, the Java program will try all possible combinations of actors, return
the number of conflicts in each configuration, and then also display the number
of conflicts caused by the given actor’s preferences. If one actor’s preferences
cause more conflicts, the assessor can opt for the other.
Fig. 4. The number of conflicts caused by equipment vendor A vs B.
For example, if Vend C were not available and the assessor had to choose
between vendors A or B, he could plot their conflicts in the same configurations
as shown in Figure 4. As shown, vendor B would be the better option in this
case, as he causes less conflicts in all scenarios.
Currently all conflicts are considered equal, but in reality some conflicts will
be more severe than others. In future work the logic engine will be extended to
allow actors to assign a weight to their preferences. Based on these preference
weights, the conflicts would also be weighted and the severity of conflicts will
also be taken into account.
4.4 Towards a Qualitative Risk Assessment
A final feature of the FAST-CPS framework is the automatic construction of
attack trees which can then be evaluated to reason about an attacker’s optimal
attack strategy. Based on the IDP output file generated in part 1, an attack
tree is automatically constructed for a chosen attacker goal. The assessor can
then model an attacker in more detail than in part 1 and evaluate the tree with
respect to this attacker. The result will be an optimal path for this attacker,
where a path is deemed optimal if it is the least difficult road to reaching the
goal. This information can then be used to perform a qualitative risk assessment
after the assessor assigns impact values to the attacker goals.
STEP 1: Generating an Attack Tree.
The FAST-CPS framework contains an additional Java program which is used
for the attack tree creation and evaluation. This program can be found at [15].
When launched, the assessor is prompted to provide a FAST-CPS output file to
build the tree from. This file is the result of the security evaluation in section 4.2.
After choosing this file, the assessor must also provide the attacker goal for
which he wants to build an attack tree. Three main types of attacker goals were
identified based on the NIST guide to industrial control system security [32]:
- Modifying a process parameter p
- Launching a denial of service on a hardware component or software module s
- Obtaining data asset d
Once the attacker has chosen a goal and provided the relevant system pa-
rameter p, s or d, the tree is automatically constructed with the chosen goal
as the root node. The tree generation algorithm uses templates that represent
attacks on the system or assess the impact of vulnerable components on possible
threats. The templates can be found at [16], the algorithm is shown below:
GenerateTree(AttackerGoal,SystemModel,Templates):
tree.root = AttackerGoal
goals = { AttackerGoal }
while goals 6= ∅ do
goal = goals.pop()
foreach Template t ∈ Templates do
if t.goal = goal then
Tree s = t.execute(goal, SystemModel)
goals.push(s.leaves)
tree.replace(goal, s)
In the hatchery case study, the assessor wants to reason about two differ-
ent kinds of attacks, performed by different attackers. First of all, the assessor
wants to know how easy it would be for malicious employees in the company or
equipment vendor network to perform a denial of service attack on their process.
Hence the first tree that will be built has as root goal DoS(Setter1PLC). When
constructing this tree, it contains 13 nodes. The tree is shown in Figure 11.
The second goal concerns the modification of process parameters. The asses-
sor wants to make sure that technicians and any outside attackers are unable to
change the incubator valves. The tree constructed for ModifyParameter(S1V )
contains 135 nodes. This tree is built in an averaged runtime of 0.26 seconds
STEP 2: Modelling the Attacker.
When the tree is created, the assessor must model the attackers which he
will evaluate the tree for. An Attacker A = (C, M, A) is defined by the set of
credentials “C ” the attacker owns, a mapping of attacker capabilities to integer
values “M ”, and a set of components in the system “A” which the attacker has
physical access to. The following attacker capabilities are considered:
- Stealing Credentials: Stealing credentials from other users in the system by
performing a phishing attack, social engineering, etc.
- Identity Spoofing : Pretending to be another entity whilst sending commands
over a channel.
- Exploiting Vulnerabilities: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in components
or modules.
- Discovering Vulnerabilities: Discovering zero-day vulnerabilities in compo-
nents or modules.
If an attacker is chosen that was modelled inside the SysML model, sets C
and A will be constructed automatically by looking at the FAST-CPS file. If the
assessor wants to consider a new outside attacker with different properties, these
credentials and components must be added manually using the “Model Attacker”
button in the program. Here the attacker capabilities are also modelled by giving
a number between 1 (no prior expertise) and 4 (expert in the subject) to each
capability.
Table 2. Attacker capabilities
Capability Technician Outsider Company Vend
Stealing Credentials 2 3 1 3
Identity Spoofing 2 4 1 2
Exploiting Vulnerabilities 4 4 2 3
Discovering Vulnerabilities 1 3 1 1
Four types of attackers are relevant for the industrial hatchery case study.
One of them is an outside attacker, the others are disgruntled employees: a
technician in the control network, an employee in the company network, and an
employee of the equipment vendor company.
The technician has access to all the components inside the process network,
but he does not possess any credentials. The outside attacker has no access and
no credentials. The employees of the company and the equipment vendor have
access to the components inside their respective networks, and do not own any
credentials from the process network. In addition, the employees from the equip-
ment vendor can connect remotely to the SCADA PC in the process network
through the EWON router placed there. The capabilities of the attackers are
shown in Table 2.
STEP 3: Evaluating the Attack Tree.
Once the attacker is modelled and an attack tree is generated, the tree can
be used to analyse security properties of the system. For now only the difficulty
of attacks is evaluated, other heuristics will be added in the future. Difficulties
range between 1 (Trivial) and 4 (Unlikely). The analysis proceeds in three steps:
First the difficulty of each leaf is determined, then the difficulty of parent nodes
is synthesized from the difficulty of their children. Once all nodes are annotated,
the optimal attacker strategy is calculated. An optimal attacker strategy is a sub-
tree of the attack tree which represents the optimal way for a modelled attacker
to reach the attacker goal. What is optimal depends on the chosen heuristic
in the tree evaluation stage, here it will be the path that results in the lowest
difficulty of achieving the attacker goal. Once the optimal attacker strategy is
returned, the assessor can identify the most vulnerable parts of the system by
looking at the leaves of the path.
Assigning Values to Leaves. Tree leaves will either be associated with an at-
tacker’s capabilities, an attacker’s access to components, or an attacker’s cre-
dentials. Once a particular type of attacker has been chosen, the difficulties are
decided as follows:
- Credential leaf: If the attacker possesses the credential, the difficulty is 1, if
he does not, the difficulty is 4.
- Access leaf: If the attacker has physical access to the component, the diffi-
culty is 1, if he does not, the difficulty is 4.
- Capability leaf: Here the algorithm assigns a difficulty based on the capability
value the attacker was given for the relevant skill. Capability values range
between 1 and 4: 1 means no prior expertise, 2 means little expertise, 3 means
moderate expertise and 4 means the attacker is an expert in the subject. A
capability value of 1 is mapped with a difficulty of 4, 2 with a difficulty of
3, etc.
Propagating Values up the Tree. Now each leaf has a difficulty d, as well as a
value s which represents the least amount of steps that must be taken to reach
it, which is 1 for leaves. These values are now propagated up the tree using the
algorithms below. Both algorithms are called on the root of the tree.
CalculateDifficulty(n):
If n is a Leaf then return n.d else
If n.o = ∧ then return Max {CalculateDifficulty(c)|c ∈ n.C}.
If n.o = ∨ then return Min {CalculateDifficulty(c)|c ∈ n.C}.
CalculateSteps(n):
If n is a Leaf then return 1 else
If n.o = ∧ then return Sum {CalculateSteps(c)|c ∈ n.C}.
If n.o = ∨ then return Min {CalculateSteps(c)|c ∈ n.C ∧ c.d is lowest
among all children}.
Calculating the Optimal Attacker Strategy. Once all the nodes in the tree have
values for the pair (d, s), the optimal attacker strategy can be calculated. The
heuristic for this can vary between implementations, the algorithm outlined be-
low prioritizes strategies with the lowest difficulty and uses s as a tie-breaker:
(d, s) < (d′, s′) ⇔ (d < d′) ∨ (d = d′ ∧ s < s′). All nodes that are part of the
optimal strategy will have their flag f set to true. A new tree S can be generated
using these nodes and the edges that connect them. The algorithm is called on
the root of the tree:
OptimalAttackerStrategy(n):
Set flag n.f to true.
If n has no children then end else
If n.o = ∧ then call OptimalAttackerStrategy(c) for each node c ∈ n.C.
If n.o = ∨ then call OptimalAttackerStrategy(c) on node c ∈ n.C such
that ∀ c′ ∈ n.C: (c.d, c.s) < (c′.d, c′.s)
Table 3. Attack difficulties
Attack Goal Technician Outsider Company Vend
DoS(Setter1PLC) N/A N/A 4 2
ModifyParameter(S1V ) 3 4 N/A N/A
The results for the case study are shown in Table 3. For employees of the com-
pany network, performing a DoS attack receives the highest possible difficulty:
4. The employees have no way of accessing the process network, which makes
the attack impossible. The employees from the equipment vendor can access the
process network remotely through the EWON router. This allows a malicious
employee to try and exploit the DoS vulnerability of the PLC. Hence the diffi-
culty for this attacker depends on his capability for exploiting vulnerabilities. A
capability of 3 corresponds to an attack difficulty of 2.
For the other attack, the outside attacker has difficulty 4 due to the lack of
access to the process network. The technicians have access to the network where
the operator passwords are stored, hence the difficulty of modifying a parameter
depends on their capability of stealing the necessary credentials. In the case of
the technician this means the attack difficulty is 3 as their capability is 2.
Based on the optimal attack strategy, i.e. the path in the tree that is coloured
red, the assessor can now identify the weak points in his system and attempt to
make it more secure.
5 Evaluation
In this section the FAST-CPS framework will be evaluated. The main purpose
of the framework is to provide useful feedback to system operators about the
security of their system, without requiring too much effort or security expertise
on the side of the operator. These points will be evaluated, as well as the scal-
ability and extensibility of the framework, and the soundness and completeness
of the feedback.
For using FAST-CPS, the main assessor effort lies in modelling the system
in the SysML modelling language. Finding the correct balance between required
input and usefulness of the returned feedback was one of the main challenges
of implementing the FAST-CPS framework. Currently the methodology makes
abstraction of some system elements, e.g. any communication protocols are not
modelled. The aim was to reduce the modelling effort as much as possible whilst
still being able to extract the desired feedback. As a result, even for more complex
systems it should not take more than a full day to model them using the SysML
approach. The use case described in the article was modelled in a matter of
hours. Possible changes to the system architecture can easily be incorporated in
the SysML model and do not require a full remodelling of the system. In related
tools, the assessor must define the workflow of the attacker as well, which is
no trivial task and security expertise is required to know how an attacker would
most likely go about attacking the system. For modelling a system in FAST-CPS,
no security expertise is required.
FAST-CPS offers multiple kinds of feedback that are not provided by other
tools. Using CPS vulnerability databases, known vulnerabilities in the hardware
and software are found and their effects on the system processes are calculated.
This process is fully automated and other than a system model the user must not
provide any input. This feedback is useful for assessors as the alternative is to
repeatedly check these vulnerability databases themselves. Also, the databases
do not show the impact of the vulnerabilities on the system processes, while the
framework does. Next, FAST-CPS helps assessors decide on which actors to use
for stakeholders roles in their system by showing them which configurations of
actors cause the least conflicts with data asset preferences. An asset profile shows
exactly what happens to data assets in the system, which is no longer trivial to
know in today’s complex system architectures. Finally, attack trees are created
automatically and show how attackers will be most likely to attack the system.
Hence the attacker workflow which is input for related tools is provided as output
by FAST-CPS. Both for the creation of the asset profile and for generating the
attack trees, the vulnerability information extracted during the first part of the
framework is used, which means the feedback is not trivial to find manually by
an assessor.
The framework does not suggest solutions on how to fix the issues in the
system. However by inspecting the leaves of an optimal attack path the assessor
can get a good idea of what the weak points in the system are, and through
the use of simulations he can change the model and try several solutions until
a new evaluation eliminates the previous shortcomings. Since the source of the
feedback are known vulnerability databases, the framework also does not help
to protect against zero-day vulnerabilities. Here it is strongly suggested to use
the framework in combination with other security measures such as an intrusion
detection/prevention system.
The inclusion of vulnerability databases also results in a drawback. Every
time new vulnerabilities are added to the databases, these must also be added
to the framework. Currently this is done manually by the FAST-CPS adminis-
trators. If the framework is to be released for commercial use, a better option
must be provided. One solution could be to run the framework as a software
application on-site that can be connected to remotely. The FAST-CPS admin-
istrators could then connect to the software and push any required updates as
software patches. However, there are drawbacks to this approach, one of which
is that the assessor must place trust in the FAST-CPS administrators. In addi-
tion, all updates would have to be pushed to every single FAST-CPS instance.
A better solution would be to place the software in the cloud. Now the assessors
of various CPS must connect to the same software instance in order to scan
their systems. This means the administrators must only keep one version of the
software up to date, rather than many. An additional benefit of using the cloud
is that there cannot be any interference between the FAST-CPS framework and
the industrial network as they remain separated.
In terms of scalability, both SysML and IDP are capable of modelling large
systems. In SysML, the assessor can continue to create new diagrams to expand
a system, whereas in IDP the structure can continue to be extended with new
tuples. In terms of evaluation, extracting vulnerabilities and computing their
impact on the system processes is a model expansion problem which means the
runtime will not increase significantly as the system gets bigger. The data flow
analysis is a search problem and here the runtime will start to slow down as a
large number of actors is modelled for each stakeholder in the system. It should
be noted that this evaluation has no real-time requirements and it is acceptable
for the data flow analysis to run multiple minutes in a worst-case scenario. For
the case study in this chapter, which presents a full-scale, real cyber-physical
system, the vulnerability extraction took on average 3.64 seconds while the data
flow analysis took on average 9.06 seconds, timed across 100 runs.
As the framework is an extension of the Papyrus Eclipse environment, it
is possible to extend it further and add new functionality to it. New Eclipse
plug-ins can be written that add additional menu options to the framework and
provide new security analysis functions.
Related to soundness and completeness of the feedback, two important ques-
tions can be asked:
- Is the feedback complete, i.e. does the framework find all vulnerabilities in
the system?
- Is the feedback sound, i.e. if the framework finds a vulnerability in the system
model, is it actually present in the system?
The answers to these questions depend on the scope of the methodology, the
accuracy of the model and whether the logic engine has been updated to contain
the latest entries of each vulnerability database:
The methodology presented in this thesis is focussed on identifying known
vulnerabilities and their impact on the system processes. Provided the logic en-
gine is up to date in terms of vulnerability databases, the framework will extract
any known vulnerabilities from the system model and accurately assess the im-
pact of these vulnerabilities on the system processes. Zero-day vulnerabilities
and their impact on the processes are outside the scope of the methodology
and will not be identified. To this end, it is advised to combine the FAST-CPS
framework with an intrusion prevention or detection system that is capable of
picking up these additional threats.
If a system vulnerability is inside the scope of the methodology, the vulnera-
bility databases have been updated in the logic engine, and the system has been
modelled correctly by the assessor, the system vulnerability will be found by the
FAST-CPS framework, so in this sense the feedback is only complete inside the
defined scope of the methodology. If any of the previous conditions are not met,
the vulnerability may not be picked up. This implies that a system is not neces-
sarily secure when the feedback returns zero vulnerabilities. Recall that this work
assumes that any unused ports are hardened, no unnecessary software is present
on workstations or HMIs, firewalls are correctly configured, etc. The framework
cannot ascertain whether this is in fact the case, which means there could still
be vulnerabilities in the system even when the methodology returns none. In
order to protect the system against these vulnerabilities, it is recommended to
combine FAST-CPS with other security measures. A full system audit should
still be performed on a timely basis in order to update the system inventory
and to evaluate the security policies and procedures, which FAST-CPS does not
provide feedback about. An intrusion detection or prevention system can be set
up alongside FAST-CPS to monitor the network traffic inside the system. If any
firewalls are wrongly configured or malware has found its way inside the network,
an IDS/IPS could detect and prevent this and keep the system secure.
Regarding soundness, when a vulnerability is found in the system model
it will also be present in the actual system. There are two exceptions to this
statement:
- When the vulnerability was the result of a simulation. In this case the vul-
nerability only occurs on the system model and not in the actual system.
The output file will always clearly state which simulations the assessor has
included in the model.
- When the assessor has incorrectly modelled his system. In this case the
feedback provided by the framework may not apply to the actual system. The
assessor has the responsibility of correctly modelling his system, guidelines
on how to do this in SysML are provided with the framework.
When the system has been modelled correctly and a returned vulnerability
is not the result of a simulation, the vulnerability will also be present in the
system, hence the feedback provided by our methodology is sound.
6 Conclusions
This article illustrates the use of the FAST-CPS framework for analysing the
security of cyber-physical systems. The framework is introduced and compared
to other security assessment tools. Then the framework is used to analyse an
industrial hatchery. The necessary steps that must be taken by the assessor are
explained in detail and the different kinds of feedback returned by the framework
are presented.
Appendix A FAST-CPS Screenshots
Fig. 5. The internal block diagram representing one of the setter touch screens.
Fig. 6. The parametric diagram representing the temperature process in the setter.
Fig. 7. The block diagram representing the policy specification of the system.
Fig. 8. The result of the first security analysis.
Fig. 9. Modelling a denial of service simulation of a software module.
Fig. 10. The result of the second security analysis using simulations.
Fig. 11. The attack tree constructed for DoS(Setter1PLC).
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